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ETHICS AND AUDITING: SETTING THE BAR TOO LOW
Keith Hooper*, Jenny Wang*
Abstract
Purpose - from a philosophical and empirical perspective this paper seeks to show how the big audit
firms have managed to set the bar low so that they offer only opinions on whether financial statements
meet accounting standards. It is argued that while the concepts of virtue ethics have now largely
disappeared, ethical legitimacy has moved beyond consequential ethics to a form of social Darwinism.
It is a Social Darwinism that is legalistic and technical as evidenced by the audit firms’ widespread use
of the Bannerman clause attached to their opinions. Design - to illustrate the shift of ethical positions,
the paper is informed illustrations of a failure to discharge a duty of care to the public. Findings – the
shift in underlying social values contributes to what the Economist Journal describes as a steady
decline in professional ethics. This arguable conclusion is supported by various illustrations and cites
the shift in combinations of cognitive, moral and pragmatic legitimacy as drivers employed by
accounting firms. Research Limitations – the paper uses secondary and documentary data and is
informed by conceptual analysis which necessarily in the realm of ethics may be contentious.
Originality – the paper seeks to link the changing social values with changes in legitimisation and to
show shifts in accounting practices like the recent practice of issuing disclaimers.
Keywords: Ethics, Disclaimers, Kant, Unilateralism, Social Darwinism, Values
*Department of Accounting, Unitec Institute of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand

1 Introduction
The paper is concerned with ethical trends in the
accounting profession. There have been an increasing
number of accounting scandals in recent years (The
Economist 2009). The trend is also revealed in the
very recent global financial crisis, which – while
possibly involving some unethical business practices
in the banking and finance industry – may also reflect
serious ethical issues in the accounting profession, as
banks enjoyed the benefits of unqualified opinions
from their auditors prior to the collapse (Sikka, 2008).
In contrast to the global trend of increasing
accounting scandals, the volume of content of the
New Zealand professional Code of Ethics (COE) has
grown from six pages to more than 120 pages.
However, the longer COE does not seem to have had
a positive impact on accounting ethics. Most ethical
codes are built on the moral traditions of their
respective societies. In this way, Accounting ethics
reflect and adapt to societal values. The New Zealand
code, it can be argued, broadly reflects the moral
inheritance of Europe, which has been refined by
philosophers like Kant, Bentham and Mill, and
Spencer (Stackhouse, 2004) . Different ethical
positions are always contentious but can be useful to
focus thinking on the role of ethics in Accounting.
This paper attempts to reveal ethical trends in the
accounting profession in New Zealand through an
analysis of the changes in underlying ethical
philosophies as reflected in the profession’s COE:

arguably derived from Kantian principles of virtue
ethics, to a more legalistic and technical rhetoric
reflective of Utilitarianism and Social Darwinism.
The accounting profession has over one hundred
years of history and has been growing in importance
to business communities and society (Backof &
Martin, 1991). The New Zealand Society of
Accountants was founded in 1908 and is now called
the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants
(NZICA).
The
accounting
professions
in
commonwealth countries are self-regulating, with
members’ behaviours being guided by their
profession’s ethics, regulations, or COE. In New
Zealand, professional ethics regulations were first
issued by the Society of Accountants in 1927. The
most recent version of the COE became effective in
2003 and was subsequently amended in 2006. This
paper argues with Abbott (1998) that the changes
from 1927 to 2006 in the COE reflect a shift from the
personal qualities of accountants to legitimacy of
technique. The 2003 COE adopts a more teleological
approach with emphasis on legitimising the
accounting profession. Preston et al (1995) observe
that originally accounting like medicine and law was
to be regarded as an occupation more heavily
influenced by the service motive than entirely by the
profit motive. As suggested by Higgins & Olson
(1972), accounting involves judgement and the
acceptance of responsibility to others.
Putting,
originally, a focus on character means as Preston et al
(1995) observe that the profession’s foundations rest
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on moral schema and code of ethics rather than
standardisation and regulation. The paper attempts to
show how the NZ COE has shifted from a focus on
character to a more functionalist model which protects
clients by delivering expert services. While such a
question cannot be resolved by discussion or by
empirical surveys, explanations can be offered for
discussion that may illuminate how ethics codes could
be derived and developed.
The plan of the paper is first to consider the
concept of legitimacy and its link with moral and
pragmatic philosophies in respect of COE. Following
the discussion of legitimacy, the paper considers some
of the elements of Kantian ethics and consequentialist
thinking (Utilitarianism, and Social Darwinism) that
have relevance to the paper. The object is to briefly
outline the differences between these philosophical
approaches to ethical problems as is necessary to
explain moral and pragmatic legitimacy. With these
differences in mind, the paper next compares the COE
of 1927 and 2003, being respectively the first and
latest COE promulgated by the accounting profession
in New Zealand. The discussion which follows draws
out concepts embodied in these COE with the overall
purpose of showing how the focus has moved from
the character of the accountant to the character of
accounting. The process is informed by a shift from a
more
deontological
position
to
a
more
consequentialist position. We illustrate this latter
consequentialist position with a case study which has
had considerable media attention in New Zealand –
that of Hanover Finance. Like the Graham case
(Baskerville-Morley, 2004), the Hanover Finance case
illustrates the shift in ethics as reflected in practice.
The accounts, reports and audit of Hanover Finance
were in a minimalist sense just within the existing
legal boundaries but there was widespread loss when
the finance company suddenly collapsed – a not
uncommon story. Anecdotal evidence has it that from
the beginning of the company’s short history that the
audit engagement was not much sought after because
of the risk involved. Before the conclusion, a
discussion is advanced to draw together three themes:
values philosophy, COE, and how the shift in values
reflected in the two COE can be shown in a recent
company collapse.
2 Legitimacy
The paper sets out, first, to outline the concept of
legitimacy which, it is argued, underpins many
professional codes of ethics. As Aldrich & Fiol
(1994) observe such a concept may be driven by (1) a
concept of legitimacy to meet pragmatic assessments
of stakeholder relations (2) a more normative response
to what is considered morally appropriate or (3)
legitimacy grounded on cognitive appropriateness. So
what is legitimacy? Suchman (1995) defines it as, “a
generalised perception or assumption that the actions
of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate

within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs and definitions”(p. 574).The appeal for
legitimacy is to a social group as a whole
notwithstanding individual reservations. It is argued
in this paper that COE are the means to establish
social legitimacy and the underlying philosophical
positions they reflect are designed to be congruent
with current social values and beliefs.
What is legitimacy overlaps with what is
legitimacy for in that legitimacy cements congruence
between an organisation and its cultural environment.
The emphasis being not so much what is desirable as
is recognisable and understandable such that would
explain and justify an organisation’s existence (Meyer
& Scott, 1983) (Meyer & Scott, 1983). Suchman
(1995) points out that the concept of legitimacy seems
to divide academic studies into two distinct groups:
strategic or institutional. The strategic studies
emphasise a management perspective which
manipulates and use effective symbols to gain societal
support (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer,
1975).By contrast, the institutional studies emphasise
cultural pressures which transcend any organisation’s
control (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan,
1991).
While the divisions between strategic and
institutional
legitimacy
are
an
important
consideration, it is the concept of legitimacy being
driven by pragmatic, moral or cognitive
considerations that arguably helps to explain why
COE may be expected to change to meet changing
social values.
Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interested
calculations of an organisation’s most immediate
audiences according to Suchman (1995). Aldrich &
Fiol (1994) point out that for pragmatic reasons
organisations may emphasis image and support such
an image by advertising. Moreover, image advertising
may foster generalised attributions of good
disposition. Whether such calculations are driven
strategically or institutionally as a result of cultural
expectations is not resolved but what is motivating is
a desire to build and maintain a reputation for
competence and reliability.
When pragmatic
strategies of legitimacy are preferred it follows that
COE will be designed to include consequentialist
values and beliefs.
By contrast, moral legitimacy is harder to
achieve. Ashforth & Gibbs (1990) conclude that for
organisations their best hope is to accumulate a record
of technical success. They observe that within the
contemporary rationalist order, technical performance
not only establishes consequential legitimacy but it
also exerts spill-over effects on moral dynamics to
provide a lasting validation for procedures, and
structures (Suchman & Eyre, 1992). Moral
legitimisation comes with a warning from Selznich
(1949) that it carries with a substantial likelihood of
unanticipated goal displacement and possibly public
cynicism.
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Suchmann (1995) argues that to further cognitive
legitimacy, gatekeepers may be employed to grant
certification to label institutions and grant preferred
definitions such as employed by the professions to
privilege members and provide them with certified
recognition. Finally, while pragmatic and moral
legitimacy can be arrived at by cost-benefit appraisals
or ethical judgements by way of public discussion
cognitive legitimacy implies unspoken assumptions as
to professional legitimacy. Some defensive
endeavours taken by professional organisations may
have the wrong effect and imperil taken for granted
assumptions. On the other hand, pragmatic legitimacy
relies on audience self-interest that it the right
organisation for the job, whereas moral and cognitive
legitimacy do not.
These observations from the literature explain
from the point of view of legitimacy, why professions
need a COE and why such a COE may combine
element of pragmatic and moral philosophies. This is
not to say that any one kind of legitimacy is dominant
in COE but rather that all three – pragmatic, moral
and cognitive - are combined. However, what is
argued is that there has been a shift within this
combination. A shift to reflect changing values not
necessarily from a strategic design but from
institutional reflexes to cultural change. The paper
seeks now to briefly outline features of ethical
philosophies, which are sources of legitimacy drawn
on by professional monopolies to underpin their COE.
3 From Kant to Social Darwinism
The principles reflected in the COE have an ethical
inheritance, which generally reflects the moral values
and ethical philosophies of the society in which they
are embedded. This section provides an overview of
principles of ethical philosophies that are reflected in
the COE, namely Kantian and Mintz’s virtue ethics,
Utilitarianism and Social Darwinism. To explain such
a reflection, the paper attempts to link elements of
these philosophies with the COE.
The position
reflected in the paper is that ethics is about choices of
principles that may right or wrong, while morality is
about good or bad, though the latter is not under
discussion.
Ethics is necessary because people’s actions may
conflict and most people are more interested in their
own welfare than in that of others. Such egoistic
actions are frequently involved in social conflicts.
Ethics has a twofold purpose: first, to find criteria by
which to distinguish right and wrong actions; second,
by means of praise and blame, to promote right
actions and discourage wrong ones (Russell, 1947, p.
807). To ameliorate social conflicts, the moral
inheritance generally shared by Europeans, which is
also shared in New Zealand, has been developed by
philosophers like Kant or modified by philosophers
like Bentham into utilitarianism. For the purpose of
this paper, the deontological arguments employed are

drawn primarily from Immanuel Kant. It is
acknowledge that there are other major deontological
contributors, but this paper is necessary limited in its
content.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argues that a
fundamental principle of morality is a rational will
and such rationality of will must be regarded as
independent and self-governing. He calls these moral
principles ‘Categorical Imperatives’ (CI) (Kant's
Moral Philosophy, 2008). He believes that “The
highest good was the good will” (Frederick, 1999, p.
3). Because humans have free will and are rational,
they are capable of reasoning what constitutes right
actions. CI are formulated so that rational beings
should abide by the maxim, “Act only on that maxim
through which you can [...] will that it should become
a universal law [for all rational beings] (Kant, 1993, p.
30)”. In other words, according to Russell, Kant
maintains an ethical position of “Do as you would be
done by” (as cited in Russell, 1947, p. 737). The
second formulation of CI is to “Act in such a way that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, never merely as a means to an
end, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant,
1993, p. 36). Kant argues that certain actions or
behaviour cannot be justified as moral based on the
outcomes from such actions. For example, a
businessman is honest because he knows that it will
attract more customers and increase profits. He is not
genuinely moral because his intention to be honest is
to increase profits under Kantian ethics. Kant’s ethics
are non-consequentialist. It is a deontological
approach, which focuses on duties rather than
consequences. The third formulation of CI is that,
“So act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom
of ends in which you were both subject and sovereign
at the same time” (Frederick, 1999, p. 4). This means
that people should abide by the maxim all of the time,
without exception. The maxim is thus a law which
applies to everyone. No one should exempt himself
from the maxim but expect others to abide by it. In
other words, Kant’s deontological approach
emphasised a sense of duty.
However, this focus on duty is not the same as a
focus on character, except that, as Aristotle observes,
“We are what we repeatedly do” (Gough, 1998). In
this vein, according to virtue ethics theory, virtues
characterise the decision maker: “Possession and
exercise of virtues tend to increase the decision
maker’s propensity to exercise sound ethical
judgements” (Armstrong, Ketz, & Owsen, 2003, p. 3).
This combines Kant’s view of rational cognitive acts,
recognising moral issues and thinking them through,
with an intention to act morally, and the ethical
character to bring that intention to fruition (Armstrong
et al, 2003). From Kant comes the element of reason
necessary to understand issues, think, and arrive at an
ethical judgement, while virtues add ethical
motivation, allowing individuals to place the interest
of others before themselves. For Pincoff (1986),
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virtues are those attributes of character that describe
an individual’s direct concern for others, which
contrasts with Adam Smith’s view that people act in
their own self-interest, egoism, and that they are
rational but greedy. Mintz (1995) believes that virtues
in accounting are linked to the requirements of
accounting professional codes: trustworthiness,
benevolence, altruism, honesty, integrity, impartiality,
open-mindedness, reliability, dependability and
faithfulness. Thus, what are for Kant elements of an
over-riding concept of “duty”, become virtues in
practice and characteristics of accountants.
In contrast to Kant’s deontological perspective,
Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) developed
utilitarianism. In essence, his teleological approach
advocates identifying the aggregate of pleasure and
pain that would best advance “the greatest happiness”
of all of those whose interest is in question. Bentham
holds not only that the good is happiness in general
but also that each individual always pursues what he
believes to be in his own happiness. He rejects Kant’s
subjectivism of what ought to be for everyone else as
merely an expression of Kant’s moral feelings.
“If each man in fact and inevitably pursues his
own pleasure, there is no point saying he ought to do
something else. Kant urged that “you ought” implies
“you can”; conversely if you cannot, it is futile to say
you ought” (Russell, 1947, p. 806).
Bentham seeks a more scientific approach in
terms of utility and consequences and by such terms
arrives at a deterministic account of mental
occurrences (Pope, 2004). Utilitarianism introduces
the idea that whether an action is ethical is based on
the outcomes resulting from that action. Using the
same example as above, the businessman is honest
because he knows that is the way to increase profits.
Because the consequence is to increase profits and
acting honestly is a way to achieve this consequence,
the businessman is considered to be morally right. In
contrast to Kantian ethics, the intention of being
honest is irrelevant as long as it achieves the ends.
Mill (1861) declares: “Utility, or the Greatest
Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness ” (p.
257). If the outcomes of action or behaviour lead to
greatest happiness, which is calculated as the sum of
the happiness of all affected people in a given
situation, that action or behaviour is ethical. This
rejects Kant’s ethics where the ethical values of
people are absolute and autonomous. Under
utilitarianism, consequences can justify the means.
For example, according to utilitarian ethics, stealing
can be justified if more people benefit from this action
than suffer losses. So where a person steals from his
wealthy neighbour’s household of four people and
gives the proceeds to an orphanage with fifteen
orphans, the stealing is an ethically permissible action
because the happiness of the fifteen orphans is greater
than the happiness of the neighbour’s household.

One of the drawbacks of utilitarianism is the
difficulty of quantifying happiness and a calculation
of happiness (Preuss, 1998). Other flaws also exist.
The concept of utilitarianism relies on legislators, who
prescribe sanctions, knowing what is in the
community’s interests while ignoring their own
interests or desire for pleasure. If, however, as Adam
Smith argues, every man always pursues his own
pleasure, how are we to ensure that the legislator will
pursue the pleasure of mankind in general? (Russell,
1947) Thus, the ideal that all pain and happiness can
be brought into calculation is, for some, flawed. For
example, those framing accounting standards must
ignore the interests of lobby groups or their own
paymasters to pursue a community’s interest, which
presupposes that they know what such interests are
and they know which side of a social conflict they
support (Tinker, 1991).
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a liberal
utilitarian, first enunciated the concepts of Social
Darwinism, drawn from the theory of natural selection
known as Lamarckism, in which acquired
characteristics are inherited. In nature, living things
can modify new traits gradually in response to needs
created by their environments and pass them on to
their offspring (Stent, Sydney, & Jeffrey, 2001).
Spencer applies this argument, with irresistible
evolutionary logic, that it is natural and proper for the
strong to survive at the expense of the weak (Spencer,
1897):
…every type that is best adapted to its
conditions, which on the average means every higher
type, has a rate of multiplication that insures a
tendency to predominate. Survival of the fittest, acting
alone, is ever replacing inferior species by superior
species. (Spencer, 1882, 2:478 cited in Weikart, 2009,
p. 24)
This paper adopts Mike Hawkins definition of
Social Darwinism as “the attempt to justify or
promote human competition for scarce resources as a
necessary, natural phenomenon fostering biological
progress” (Weikart, 2009, p. 21). It has two central
assumptions. First, it suggests that there are
underlying and irresistible forces acting in societies,
which are like natural forces that operate in the animal
and plant kingdoms. Second, these social forces are of
a kind to produce evolutionary progress through
natural conflict between social groups. The best
adapted and most successful groups survive these
conflicts (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1994).
Indeed, to support those unfit to survive can be argued
to be morally incorrect, but that does not mean that
the opportunity for self-improvement should be
denied (Hawkins, 1997). For example, the American
capitalist, Andrew Carnegie, was an overt Social
Darwinist, using his vast fortune to establish libraries
and other educational institutions so that the so-called
weak might have the opportunity for selfimprovement (Hawkins, 1997). Social Darwinism
introduces a laissez-faire approach to business
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(Weikart, 2009). “The business of business is
business” is a quote attributed to Milton Friedman, an
advocate of laissez-faire economics. Taking this
observation as the hallmark of Social Darwinism, the
relevance of this philosophy to the latest COE is
found in the espoused qualities of competence and
technical efficiency. More broadly, Social Darwinism
mainly holds that it is good to be successful and that
eliminating
weaker
competition
facilitates
evolutionary progress. It justifies ruthless competition
and argues that it is both natural and proper to exploit
the weak (Bergman, 2001).
Echoes of Social
Darwinism arguably resound whenever the concept of
“the business of business is business” is used to reject
suggestions of business social responsibility and may
be applied to audit firms who justify disclaimers to
third parties on the grounds that they owe only a duty
of care to those who pay them.
Neimark (1995) observes that, “What constitutes
ethical behaviour at any time is socially constructed; it
is a product of time and place” (p. 94).
Such
behaviour may be constructed from concepts of
legitimacy, whether pragmatic, moral or cognitive
according to current values.
To explain the
dominance of Social Darwinism today, Neimark
(1995) argues that social, economic and political
structures, collectively and inevitably, produce
patterns of behaviour that are not ethical even by
contemporary Western standards:
“We must consider the relationship between
what individuals do and the institutional structures
and the ideological underpinnings of capitalism,
including its emphasis on Social Darwinism,
individualism,
competition,
and
material
acquisitiveness” (p. 93).
Some blending of these opposing philosophical
positions (Kant, Utilitarianism and Social Darwinism)
is the basis and justification for most modern business
interpretations of ethics and for various professional
COE (Stackhouse, 2004). In the next section, the
paper shows how these three philosophical positions
are reflected in the accounting professions COE in
New Zealand. Through the analysis, the paper
demonstrates the inclination and the trend of
prevailing philosophies reflected in COE. To achieve
this, the paper compares the New Zealand accounting
profession’s first COE in NZ, issued in 1927, with the
current one, issued in 2003.
4 New Zealand's Code of Ethics (COE)
This section identifies differences in the content of the
1927 and the 2003 COE. By analysing these changes,
this section attempts to demonstrate the shift that has
occurred in their underlying ethical philosophies.
The New Zealand Society of Accountants
adopted its first Professional Ethics code in 1927. This
consists of 17 clauses and is six pages in length
(attached as Appendices A). The 17 clauses cover a
range of requirements, including: the overall

characteristics of professional accountants (clause 12), confidentiality (clause 3), disclosure of conflict of
interests (clause 4), relationship with other
accountants and the profession (clause 5-9),
advertising (clause 10), obligation to stakeholders
(clause 11), unbiased judgement (clause 12), no
commission dealing (clause 13), obligations to the
profession and the Society (clause 14-17). As Preston
et al(1995) found in the 1917 American Association
of Public Accountants code of ethics there were
similar prohibitions against encroachment and
advertising. According to Preston et al (1995) the
term independence was not used until 1964, rather the
emphasis is “replete with exhortations of duty,
responsibility and loyalty” (p. 513). They argue such
ethics reflect contemporary conceptualisations of
morality and societal culture to legitimise the
profession within a wider public domain. The
insistence is on good character. Preston at al (1995)
suggest that the focus was on forming oneself as an
ethical subject and being of good character was the
basis for legitimising the activities on accountants.
This focus on duty, responsibility and loyalty ties in
with the concepts virtue ethics.
The first paragraph of the 1927 Professional
Ethics, which has disappeared from the current COE,
reads:
Every member of the Society in the practice of
his profession or in the course of his service to his
employer should give such service with absolute
fidelity and should be actuated by a spirit of fairness
to client and employer, considerate to the fellow
practitioners, loyalty to his country, and devotion to
high ideals of courtesy and honour (p.1).
The stated virtues of professional members
include “absolute fidelity”, “a spirit of fairness”, being
“considerate to the fellow practitioners”, “loyalty to
his country”, and “high ideals of courtesy and
honour”.
These virtues are also reflected in
subsequent clauses. For example, clause 5 stipulates
that practitioners “should not use unfair means to win
professional advancement or to injure the chances of
another Public accountant to secure and hold
employment”, reinforcing the concept of fairness in
dealing with other people.
Furthermore, clause 10 requires that practitioners
should only advertise their services by means of a
“card”, the size of which should be small in a
newspaper or directory and whose content should
include only the name, title and address of the
advertiser.
Such advertising is very humble,
suggesting that, at the time, the Society discouraged
advertising of its professional members in order to
avoid competition between them. It may reflect also
professionals’ consideration and courtesy for their
fellow practitioners and a collective distaste for
image creation. Competition among practitioners may
result in competing fees and it may be regarded as
being not honourable to compete with each other for
fees. This requirement has disappeared from the 2003
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code, which is silent with regard to intra-professional
competition. Indeed, for pragmatic reasons of
legitimacy as Aldrich & Fiol (1994) observe image
advertising may foster generalised attributions of
good disposition.
In addition, Clause 11 specifies that practitioners
have responsibilities towards “prospective investors,
creditors, or others” during the course of preparing or
certifying statements. The responsibilities owed to
prospective investors or other third parties in 1927
code were explicit. The 2003 code remains silent
about duties towards ‘prospective investors’. The
requirements prescribed in the 1927 COE focus on
personal characteristics or the good will of rational
beings. It reflects both a Kantian “duty”-based ethical
approach, which believes that rational beings have a
duty to act with good will, and a virtue ethics view of
the codes as found in Mintz (1995). Values such as
fidelity, consideration, loyalty, courtesy and honour
are often used to characterise a good person. They
assume a sense of self moral regulations governing
how accountants should act. The 1927 code focuses
on duty and, by repetitive practice, such duties
become virtues, which in turn become the
characteristics of accountants. Such virtues imply a
deontological ethical philosophy underlying the 1927
code, which focus on virtue as forming character
(Mintz, 1995).
The current COE comprises two parts, the first
part being 63 pages long, and the second part,
Independence in Assurance Engagements, being 60
pages long. It reveals a discourse as Previts & Merino
(1979) found of increasing use of legalistic and
technical rhetoric and a growing concern with public
relations. The COE contains five fundamental
principles, including Integrity, Objectivity and
Independence, Competence, Quality Performance and
Professional Behaviour. Each principle is broken
down into detailed rules, with applications provided to
illustrate how the rules apply in different situations.
According to NZICA’s official website, the current
COE comprises “fundamental principles and provide
guidance on professional conduct needed to sustain
public confidence in the profession” (NZICA, n.d.).
This implies that accountants need to behave
professionally in order to sustain public confidence
and that sustained public confidence is an outcome of
acting professionally. Therefore, the current COE
promotes behavioural rules or regulations that instruct
professionals how to behave with the aim of
maintaining public confidence. The emphasis is that
accountants should behave in such a way as to deliver
the desired outcome. Their conduct is justified by the
outcomes they lead to, implying an underlying
consequentialist ethics philosophy.
There are two fundamental principles introduced
into the current COE to regulate how accountants
should do their job to ensure that they provide quality
service. These are competence and quality
performance:

Competence - Members must only undertake
professional work in which they have the Competence
necessary to perform the work to the technical and
professional standards expected. (p 3)
Quality Performance - Members must perform
their professional work with due care and diligence,
ensuring that all professional obligations are
completed in a timely manner and are carried out in
accordance with the relevant technical and
professional standards appropriate to that work. (p 3)
These two principles, not in the original code,
mainly deal with technical competence and good
quality work. Competence and Quality Performance
are required to assure the public that accounting
professionals are technically competent to deliver
their service. This is similar to a quality control
procedure in a manufacturing factory for ensuring the
quality of products so that they can be competitive in
the marketplace. It can be argued that this similarity
suggests that the two principles are not so relevant to
ethics, but are more like a quality control procedure.
Some authors share this view. Velayutham (2003)
analysed both New Zealand and Australian COE and
argues that “the main focus of the codes … is quality
rather than ethics” (p. 484). Further, he states that
“Compliance
with technical
standards
and
professional behaviour could not be considered to be
ethical principles since their compliance depends on
law like statements and quality standards” (p. 494). In
relation to competence, Fogarty (1995) adds, “The
central message of quality … fails to express any
coherent moral ideas” (p. 111). On the other hand, it
may be argued that quality does have an ethical
dimension especially when clients are unaware of
what constitutes a quality standard. According to
Dellaportas (2005) the social contract concept and
clients’ reliance on the knowledge of the professional
accountant professional competence should be
perceived to be a duty of the professional accountant.
The addition of these two principles to the
current COE implies that quality work is at least
equally as important as accountants’ character, if not
even more so. Velayutham (2003) also comments on
the quality focus of the current COE and maintains
that it reflects a shift from the ideals of sentient beings
to standards of service, where “technique has
character as an important value” (p. 501). This may
reflect a Social Darwinian approach in that the
accounting profession seeks competent people who
can deliver quality work. People who are not
technically competent enough should not be in the
profession. The accounting profession needs such
technically-competent people to maintain its public
profile, and possibly improve its reputation and
image, so that the whole profession becomes stronger
and more influential in the business community and
society.
Apart from the two new quality focused
principles, other principles also reflect their utilitarian
origin. For example, the purpose of the Integrity
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principle is that “It is members’ adherence to the
fundamental principle of Integrity that allows the
public to derive their trust in the accountancy
profession” (p.7). Although integrity can be seen as a
virtue, in here, there is an aim to being honest.
Integrity is required to gain trust from the public.
Therefore integrity is a means to reach an outcome,
Some authors argue that the primary purpose of
a COE is to improve the image of the profession and
there is for pragmatic reasons of legitimacy good
reason to promote such an image (Backof & Martin,
1991; Fogarty, 1995). According to Kantian ethics,
this is not morally right because the purpose of having
integrity or providing quality service is not to improve
a profession’s image; rather, the motive is on
goodness as an absolute moral principle. By contrast,
according to utilitarianism, integrity and quality
service are needed to earn a good public image for the
profession. Accounting professionals’ characteristics
are less relevant if they do not result in improving the
public’s image of the profession. The focus of
competence and quality performance are arguably
primarily technical issues aimed at legitimising the
profession’s monopoly particularly in assurance
engagements (Mitchell, Puxty, Sikka, & Willmott,
1994).
Furthermore, the principles of Independence and
Objectivity outlined in Rules 3 &4 in the current COE
are to ensure that professional accountants are
objective when making professional judgements
particularly for assurance engagements. However,
Williams (1992) points out that independence in
accounting has shifted from being conceived as an
integral part of character to being regarded as an
economic commodity. The consequence of this shift
is that independence is now the focus of much
interpretation as a claim to independence is not longer
credible to the general public.
Claims to
independence need today to be supported by rules
specifying its nature and scope (Preston, et al., 1995).
Such rules of independence are expressed in rules that
are seen to be more precise and legally interpretable
so that compliance or non-compliance can be
determined. The importance of codifying ethics into
rules is, as Preston et al (1995) point out; a big part of
legitimation. While rules may be a source of
legitimation in contemporary society, this increasing
emphasis as Preston et al (1995) observe, “raises the
question as to whether the code and the discourses
surrounding it may be defined as moral” (p. 528).
Rules require only conformity and no moral
discernment. As Francis (1991) comments that the
moral question as to how I, an accountant, should act
in a particular situation becomes a legalistic rather
than a moral one.
Some writers question the motive of this
principle. For example, Mitchell et al. (1994) examine
audit failures and alleged unprofessional conduct by
accounting firms and their partners in UK. They find
that professional accounting bodies failed to take

effective action against offending firms or their
partners. Therefore they argue that “The ideals of
independence and integrity, [...] are little more than a
smokescreen, or fig-leaf, for the pursuit and protection
of sectional interests” (p. 48). Allen (1997) also states:
Independence is not a value in and of itself.
Independence in this context is an instrumental value.
We value it because we think it helps produce
something else: efficiency (of the capital markets and
thus, efficiency of the economy as a whole(p. 3).
According to Preuss (1998),utilitarianism offers
an advantage to accountants in that it links selfinterest with moral behaviour and is by definition selfserving (i.e. he argues that utilitarianism is formulated
on a deterministic psychology that every individual
seeks his own happiness). It is, he argues, by default
the most influential ethical theory in the business
context. The calculation of greatest happiness and
harm shares similarities with the calculation of profit
and loss.
Accountants can be seen as conveying neutral
information on which users can base their decisions
and, in this sense, the consequences can only be
helpful. However, in as much as the COE focus on the
consequences of an ethical action, it would seem that
the COE conveys legitimacy to both professional
monopoly and the wider public.
The importance of these principles is reflected in
the introduction section of the current COE
The Code of Ethics recognises that the objectives
of the accountancy profession are to work to the
highest standards of professionalism, to attain the
highest levels of performance and generally to meet
the public interest requirement. This Code is designed
to provide members with authoritative guidance on
minimum acceptable standards of professional
conduct. The Code focuses on essential matters of
principle and is not to be taken as a definitive
statement on all matters.
Perhaps the exposure draft (ED) of the latest
COE spells out the importance of fundamental
principles more clearly. (An ED was issued by
Professional Standard Board in December 2010 and
the new COE became effective on the 1 January
2012). According to section 100.1 of the ED
“A distinguishing mark of the accountancy
profession is its acceptance of the responsibility to act
in the public interest. Therefore, a member’s
responsibility is not exclusively to satisfy the needs of
an individual client or employer. In acting in the
public interest, a member shall observe and comply
with this Code”.
Again, the COE emphasises that to adhere to the
principles is to sustain a public interest. Public interest
is what sets members of the profession apart as a
group of “ethical and competent accountants”
compared to accountants who are outside the
profession. The paradox is that the professional
qualified accountants are trying to limit their
responsibility to the public by introducing something
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like the Bannerman clause. Such clauses undermine
the concept of public interest and, as a consequence,
the COE looks more like a screen to legitimate the
profession The self-interest of the Bannerman type
clauses imply a social Darwinist influence. As other
have observed for some time the profession needs to
have a COE to promote their own interests, secure
privileges and stay competitive (Johnson, 1972;
Larson, 1977; Preston, et al., 1995; Willmott, 1986).
Overall, the differences between the 1927 and the
current COE and the 1927 codes illustrate a shift in
the ethics philosophies underlying them. The 1927
code implies a deontological approach, whereas the
2003 Code reflects a teleological approach. Some of
this shift may be explained by the confusion that the
“new burst of interest in business ethics in
universities” has evoked (Stackhouse, 2004, p. 238).
He goes on to write:
Textbooks written for these [ethical] courses
seldom treat theological issues, focusing instead on
some combination of Kantian principles, utilitarian
calculus and various versions of social Darwinism.(p.
238)
An explicit example of a shift in the COE to
limit the obligations to stakeholders is evidenced by
Baskerville-Morley (2004). She refers to the Graham
case which led to statutory reform of the accounting
profession in New Zealand. For some time prior to
1991, the Chartered Accountants Society in New
Zealand had maintained a Fidelity Fund to
recompense clients who had been cheated by their
‘black sheep’ members. It was a characteristic of
being a ‘Chartered Accountant’ which, by having the
fund, combined a sense of duty and virtue as
hallmarks of a profession. That is, the profession,
recognising that it must inevitably at some time have
“bad” members, set out to protect unknown third
parties from the effects of these members’ activities.
However, as Baskerville-Morley (2004) points out,
following the Graham case, which emptied the
Fidelity Fund , the then ‘Big 6’ accounting firms in
New Zealand in conjunction with other practitioners
no longer wanted to maintain the fund and lobbied
successfully for its cessation. Since then, injured third
parties have no resort to the profession for
recompense. The outcome is consistent with Sikka’s
(2000) determination from the UK that power
symmetries meant that private profit, not human
welfare, was the dominant behavioural driver. The
push to abolish the Fidelity Fund concealed a power
asymmetry between the influence of the Big 6 firms
and that of other members of the profession in small
and medium partnerships (Baskerville-Morley, 2004).
The following section draws on another New
Zealand case, that of the failure surrounding Hanover
Finance, which shares similar features to the
Baskerville-Morley’s (2004) Graham case in that it
attracted high public attention because the majority,
least dominant, stakeholders were marginalised. Like

the Graham case, the Hanover Finance case illustrates
how the shift in the COE is reflected in practice.
5 Pragmatic
Finance case

legitimacy:

the

Hanover

As described above legitimacy comprises a
combination of moral, cognitive and pragmatic
elements. Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the selfinterested calculations of an organisation’s most
immediate audiences according to Suchman (1995).
The case illustrated reflects a shift towards pragmatic
legitimacy and rather less of moral (what is morally
appropriate) or cognitive (what is grounded on
cognitive appropriateness) legitimacy. In this case,
the audit firm’s most immediate audience was the
small group of major shareholders controlling
Hanover.
In December 2009, it was announced that 16,000
so-called “Mum and Dad” depositors in the failed
finance company, Hanover Finance, had voted to take
shares in Allied Finance, another New Zealand
finance company, in order to seek future repayment
(Eriksen, 2008). The “Mum and Dad” investors had,
in reality, lost most of their money as the new shares
that they had to accept in place of the deposits with
Hanover Finance are of little and diminishing value. It
is a story of social conflict, where accounting served
the interests of one side of this conflict, that of the
controlling shareholders - accounting taking the form
of one of the Big 4 firms. The Big 4 firms enjoy
considerable market place legitimacy resting on their
recognisability (cognitive legitimacy) and good
reputation for efficient audits (moral legitimacy). It is
the third element in the legitimacy combination, the
pragmatic that features as dominant in this story.
The case attracted huge media attention in New
Zealand. Television cameras camped outside the
homes of the controlling shareholders who, to avoid
further interviews, fled the country. The media
sensed corruption and fraud but, in fact, as the
auditors were probably aware, the company’s
financial reports were within the “form” of the law
(such as existed) if not its substance. The Hanover
Finance story begins in 2006.
Thousands of
depositors were drawn to Hanover Finance by
television advertising fronted by a popular television
news reader, Richard Long, who gave authenticity to
what would subsequently be shown to be extravagant
claims:
The Long advertising strategy was highly
successful and at the end of the June 2006 year the
company had total assets of more than $1 billion and
was ranked number one in terms of total assets and
net profit after tax in the KPMG Property
Development and Commercial Finance category.
(Gaynor, 2008)
What was not disclosed in the advertising and
prospectus was that nearly 20% of the company’s
assets were related-party loans with a capitalised
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interest facility relating to property bought by the
controlling shareholders that was worth much less
than their book value. Amazingly, under accrual
rules, the interest due but not received from the
related-party loans were treated as income and the
audits were not qualified. What is of significance is
that as the years progressed increasingly more of
Hanover Finance’s loans became related-party loans
and 93% of these loans were on a capitalised interest
basis, with only 7% paying interest. Moreover, a
capitalised loan is where interest is added to the
principal instead of being paid, so that interest is
deferred. Nevertheless, “Hanover included this
interest as interest received and, as a result, was able
to give the impression that its earnings were far
stronger than they actually were from a cash income
point of view” (Gaynor, 2008). Such an accounting
policy, while not strictly illegal, is misleading and
says much about the how the auditors viewed these
transactions. To accept the form rather than the
substance of these transactions implies that drivers of
moral and cognitive legitimacy were weakly held. If,
as Suchmann (1995) observes, “Pragmatic legitimacy
rests on the self-interested calculations”, then the
driver in this sad story seems to be self-interest.
The accounting misdemeanours were several. In
New Zealand directors are supposed to declare
dividends only after confirming that the business is a
going concern. The six major shareholders of Hanover
Finance distributed 5.5 million dividends to
themselves after its profits plunged and shortly before
interest payments were suspended. As one business
commentator observes, this action was hardly
justifiable (Gaynor, 2008).
Whether the auditors questioned the solvency
declaration is unknown. It may be argued that had the
auditors respected the Bannerman judgment of
responsibility to unknown third parties then they may
have been prompted to ask further questions. But
they chose not to this and the Big 4 firms are now
adopting a specific “Bannermann” clause to their
audits denying responsibility to anyone except the
shareholders as a body. Quite what “as a body”
means no one knows.
Inter-company loans can obscure the state of a
holding company's true financial situation. Without
consolidated accounts, investors cannot be assured
that so-called “stringing” or "hydraulicking”is not
taking place. Stringing or hydraulicking is commercial
slang used to describe the way a finance company
might use one loan book as equity to raise another.
The result is a complex structure that is more highly
leveraged than is possible to see from the available
information. When asked about the inter-company
loans, Mr Hotchin, one of Hanover Finance’s
controlling shareholders, pointed to each finance
company's trust deed as well as the signoff from the
Big 4 auditors as reasons why investors should be
reassured (Cone, 2004). In other words, the image of

legitimacy created by the Big 4 firms was enough to
silence critics.
Since the controlling shareholders of Hanover
Finance always acted to just within such laws as exist
to control finance company operations, their auditors
also were always able to endorse their transactions. As
Tinker (1991) observes, accounting inevitably favours
one side of a social conflict. In spite of a new COE in
2003, the practices that ruined the New Zealand share
market in the late 1980s were repeated: extravagant
advertising to draw investors, unwarranted dividend
payments from capital, lack of consolidation so as to
hide illiquid subsidiaries, and inter-company loans to
related parties.
The central point with regard to this case and its
relevance to the paper is that the auditors – postBannerman – chose to issue unqualified audit reports
which served the interests of a small group of
Hanover Finance shareholders. The case is now under
investigation. Chartered accountants are given a
monopoly over audit work because they enjoy
legitimacy. Cognitively, they are recognised as the
appropriate professional body and their advertising is
cultivated to covey an image of responsibility and
integrity.
Morally and cognitively, they enjoy
legitimacy because of their professional image. Yet,
the auditors in the Hanover Finance case sought to
serve specific interests. This shift from ‘means’ to
‘ends’ is a shift exemplified in terms of the driving
features of legitimacy.
6 Discussion
Ethical problems in accounting and auditing are
global. Sikka (2010) refers to the Lehman insolvency
and warns that the public should be sceptical of the
audited reports published by large corporations. Sikka
(2010) comments:
Ernst & Young, Lehman's auditors, collected
$31mn in fees in 2007, and knew of Lehman's $ 50 bn
Repo 105 accounting gimmick, but did not make or
demand public disclosures even though the insolvency
examiner argues (page 735) that "the only purpose or
motive for the transactions was reduction in balance
sheet … there was no substance to the transactions".
Repo 105 had been in existence since 2001. Perhaps,
the auditing firm was unwilling to upset its
paymasters. (p. 1)
It is this question of accountants and auditors
accepting the “form” of transactions rather than
enquiring too deeply into their “substance” that is a
troubling problem, as illustrated in the Hanover
Finance case cited above. Reducing the balance sheet
by off-balance sheet techniques may not be
uncommon but most auditors would or should be
aware of such practices. As Sikka (2010) states,
Some estimates have suggested that banks may
have organised as much as $ 5,000 bn off their
balance sheets and window-dressed their leverage.
Despite the chicanery, all distressed banks received
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clean bills of health from their auditors. If auditors
are unwilling to speak up on accounting gimmicks of
$ 50 bn or $ 5,000 bn, there is no point is continuing
with the present arrangements. (“Lehman chicanery
is tip of the iceberg” The Guardian, 16 March 2010)
What this paper tries to show is that the practices
referred to by Sikka (2010) and illustrated in the
Hanover Finance case occur because of the economic
practice of what Shearer (2002) refers to as “granting
value to a desired object only insofar as the object
stands in instrumental relation to the desiring subject
(p. 553) Shearer explains further, “In the language of
Kant, the other is made a means rather than an end in
herself, and by this act is objectified and her own
subjectivity denied” (p. 553).
The unfortunate
Hanover Finance investors were of no consequence to
the auditors and as “others” were only a “means”
whereby audit fees were collected. In other words,
calculation of self interest prevailed and served a
legitimising strategy.
The practice of accounting is driven by the
assumptions of neo-classical economics: “the subject
will do that and only that for which he expects a net
gain in well-being”(Arrow, 1979, pp. 111-112). This
deep rooting of accounting within neo-classical
economic theory has been observed by many (Cooper
& Sherer, 1984; Gray, 1992; Hines, 1989; Lukka,
1990; Mouck, 1995; Preston, et al., 1995; Reiter,
1994; Thompson, 1998; Tinker, 1991; Tinker,
Lehman, & Neimark, 1991; Tinker, Merino, &
Neimark, 1982) . The problem with neo-classical
assumptions is that, as Shearer (2002) observes,
If economic theory does not effectively restrict
itself to discrete domains of human life, then it is at
risk of colonizing the whole of human experience,
ensuring that human subject understand themselves
and one another as self-interested utility maximizers,
even in those domains of human engagement most
removed from market transactions. (p. 549)
In other words, neo-classical economic theory
practices an imperialism that spreads to the whole of
human experience. But where do these assumptions
draw their strength? Stigler (1981) comments, “We
believe that man is a utility-maximising animal …,
and to date we have not found it informative to carve
out a section of his life in which he invokes a different
goal of behaviour” (p.176). The result as Shearer
(2002) explains is that, “Within economic discourse
each individual is properly held accountable only for
the pursuit of her or his private good” (p. 556). As
utility-maximising animals our origins and
motivations can be explained by Social Darwinism.
But this was not always the case. Before Spencer,
there was Kant where, perhaps, more in theory than
practice, society thought honour was paramount and
that the means justified the ends. However, as the
COE separated by time witness, other ideas prevail:
“self-interest (broadly construed) becomes the only
motive that appears rational for a sovereign and selfdetermining subject” (Shearer, 2002, p. 555).

To nail down their pragmatic self-interest
further, accounting firms are issuing Bannermaninspired disclaimers with their audits – a practice that
as some firms are realising might have the selfdefeating result of undermining the worth of the audit
(ACCA, 2008). In this way, economic theory invites
the imperialism of self-interest into every aspect of
human behaviour as natural and self evident. The
result is that, within economic discourse, each
individual is properly held accountable only for the
pursuit of her or his private good (Shearer, 2002,
p.555). Thus, legal judgements (Caparo Industries v
Dickman and Touche Ross & Co, 1990, and Royal
Bank of Scotland v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay,
2005) based on this discourse have found that third
parties (who do not pay directly for the audit service)
cannot hold auditors accountable. However, as
financial reports are held to be true and fair as a
consequence of an unqualified audit, it seems odd that
they are deemed only true and fair to those who can
pay for them.
These judgements represent as a
consequence a shift in legitimacy to pragmatic
considerations being paramount and give the green
light to audit firms who seek to narrow their
responsibilities as in the Hanover Finance case.
Unfortunately for the auditors and the controlling
shareholders, the wider public had not appreciated this
shift in legitimising accounting as a more pragmatic
calculation. The media attention that the Hanover
Finance case engendered was huge, with television
cameras camped outside the homes of the controlling
shareholders to seek interviews which were not
forthcoming as both main shareholders fled the
country. One of the controlling shareholders was
even pursued by the media to his new home in
Hawaii. As has been cited, the only defence offered
by one of the directors is that they had a clean audit,
so what was the problem? However, the New
Zealand media interest in the Hanover Finance case
that was aroused can be explained because the public
has not understood that audits are tailored to meet the
expectations of their fee-paying clients. The image
that accounting firms have cultivated is at odds with a
legitimacy driven by more self-interested calculations.
This was not the kind of legitimacy the New Zealand
public expected it was granting to accounting firms.
An expectation gap had emerged. The old unwritten
social contract gave legitimacy that featured more
cognitive and moral drivers though there was always
present a pragmatic driver. Now it has emerged that,
with or without disclaimers, some auditors are selling
a “true and fair view”, which may not be a “true and
fair view” for other stakeholders. In other words, self
interest prevails and those that can pay receive what
they pay for, those that do not or cannot pay for the
service cannot expect to be catered for. This is how
the invisible hand of Adam Smith works: people
supply what people are willing to pay for. It is not the
invisible hand of God but that of Social Darwinism.
It was these principles from another age that the
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earliest COE drew on. The current COE has a
legitimising and reassuring role for its members and
the public, but the source of such legitimisation has
assumed more of a pragmatic, consequentialist
direction and is part utilitarian and part Social
Darwinist and less deontological. However, this
analysis is limited by the extent that legitimacy is a
motivating element for profession and their COE.
Also, the analysis is based on the assumption that
COE are derived from certain philosophical ethical
theories and such COE may be drawn up without any
prior thought as to underlying philosophical positions.
7 Conclusion
A longer, more detailed COE does not appear to have
any effect on moral trends in accounting. Globally,
there is evidence of a spread in self-interested
“egoism” capitalism (The Economist, 2009), which
may be a reflection of concepts drawn from social
Darwinism. The cause of these shifts in the COE has
been shown by Sikka et al (1989, 2000) and
Baskerville-Morley (2004) to result from crisis
situations and a subsequent asymmetry of
stakeholders which allows some dominant
stakeholders to become definitive. The effects have
been, as argued in this paper, to narrow the sphere of
public responsibility and promote self-interest.
Although the current COEs aim to sustain public
reputation of the profession, in reality the codes
appear to legitimate the profession at a pragmatic
level. The Hanover Finance case was cited as New
Zealand’s contribution to this trend as this typical case
explains why there has been widespread failure of
most of New Zealand's finance companies. Audits
were performed, but because of insufficient
regulation, the same dubious accounting practices
were condoned by the auditors who would seem to
have interpreted their duty of care narrowly to serve
their actual paymasters. Such end results undermine
the advertising of the profession to convey an image
of disinterested integrity and possibly have a
consequence of calling for even more image
advertising. By contrast, the original COE was
carefully restrictive and reduced advertising to a small
card.
The current COE would have us believe
accounting can serve the public interest by being
utilitarian – meaning objective and without bias, and
serving both sides of any social conflict. While, in
theory, everyone’s happiness is equally important, in
practice, as some commentators have pointed out,
such egalitarianism is inevitably denied. A calculation
has to be performed by either appointed or
unappointed moral legislators as to whose happiness
constitutes the greatest happiness. Unhappily, such
legislators may prefer their own happiness, or that of
their paymasters, and bias the calculation. Arguably,
utilitarianism in its ideal sense is the better ethical
position for the profession to pursue. However, ethical

preferences are contentious and discussion can serve
to illuminate differences in practice. The point being
that as "The Rot Spreads" (The Economist, 2009, p. 3)
a focus on ethical issues in Accounting are
worthwhile. Since the 1927 publication of the first
New Zealand COE, the world has changed and other
ideas now prevail. This is not to argue that before
1927 some ideal sense of duty and virtue existed. The
celebrated Graham case illustrates that before Graham
emptied the Fidelity Fund, such a fund existed to
reimburse third parties who were the victims of
predatory accountantsThe Hanover Finance case in
New Zealand illustrates how the self-interest driver of
legitimacy is predominant.
Arguably, such
pragmatism is reflective of unconsciously absorbed
Social Darwinist thinking which has an effect on
institutions and accounting practices globally. For
accountants such egoistical thinking, albeit often
unconsciously absorbed, is a licence for practices that
are directed to legitimising narrowly-served interests
that, while possibly passing as legal, externalise an
ethical cost to the wider public.
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